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Institut de recherche pour la conservation des zones humides méditerranéennes

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Titre :	The "wild bird hypothesis" in the epidemiology of highly pathogenic avian influenza - recent situation and critical assessment of the position of the German Federal Research Institute for Animal Health (FLI) (state of June 2015)
Auteurs :	Memens Steiof, Auteur ; Johan Mooij, Auteur ; Peter Petermann, Auteur
Type de document :	Article
Dans :	Vogelwelt (Die) (135(3) 2015)
Article en page(s) :	131-145
Résumé :	In 2005-2007 the highly pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus "H5N1" spread through large parts of Europe. Since November 2014 the subtype H5N8, a recombinant descendant of H5N1 has made a similar appearance. This subtype has been known since 2013 in East Asia where it has caused devastating outbreaks among poultry in South Korea in 2014, also infecting wild birds. In Europe the virus caused outbreaks between November 2014 and February 2015 in eleven poultry holdings in Germany, the Netherlands, England, Italy and Hungary. It is most likely, that the virus came to Western Europe by poultry trade with South Korea, since no outbreaks are known in the space between these regions. Following the outbreaks in Western European poultry holdings, a few cases of infected wild birds were reported (some ducks, two Mute Swans and one gull), however, so far without scientific and transparent documentation. In January 2015 there were three more outbreaks in a zoo, a public park with domesticated animals and a small animal holding in cities of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.As in 2006 and 2007, the Friedrich-Loeffier-Institute (FLI), the German Federal Institute for Animal Diseases, propagated the "wild bird hypothesis" as explanation for the introduction of highly pathogenic AIV in Europe. According to this hypothesis wild birds play a key role as reservoir and vector of HPAI-viruses. However, no evidence for this thesis has been found anywhere in the world. To the contrary, it seems rather unlikely: among 800,000 wild birds tested worldwide HPAIV was usually only detected, where the virus was already circulating in commercial poultry holdings. In poultry it frequently appears first in large factory farm holdings with high biosecurity. Wild birds are dead ends for HPAI viruses. If they die, the virus vanishes as well. Longer chains of infection are not known from the wild. Even after events of mass infections of wild birds the virus disappears from the environment in a few weeks, at most. Additionally there has never been any evidence for wild birds carrying the virus into a poultry holding.Furthermore, the FLI still composes its Avian Influenza Risk Assessment on the assumption of the wild bird hypothesis. To support this the FLI authors cite several publications, some of which, however, have already been shown some years ago to be faulty or inadequate (STEIOF 2005, PETERMANN 2006, FEARE 2007). Therefore, the risk assessment and actions taken by veterinary authorities are badly focused. Indeed, the monitoring of avian influenza in wild birds and poultry has so far failed to detect highly pathogenic Avian Influenza in any one case before outbreaks became obvious. Similarly the way of introduction of HPAIV could not be determined in any one case. It is an error to focus the monitoring effort on wild birds, free-range and backyard poultry. This should urgently been replaced by effective controls and actions in factory poultry I farming. Without any real solution, some common values may be endangered: wild birds are threatened by release of perilous viruses from poultry holdings to the environment. Furthermore, rare poultry breeds and races are threatened by obligatory housing due to veterinary law, which I makes their keeping impossible. Eco-farming as well as animal welfare is being challenged by the difficulties to keep free-range poultry in species-appropriate conditions, while factory poultry [holdings in closed biosecurity premises are being privileged.

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